In a stark contradiction that has plunged prospects for ending the three-month war between the United States and Iran into uncertainty, Iranian officials have rejected President Donald Trump’s assertion that a peace settlement has been reached. On Thursday, June 11, 2026, Trump announced from the White House Oval Office that
“We just made a great settlement of the war with Iran,”
declaring that documents would be finalized “over the next few days” and the deal could be signed
“maybe over the weekend in Europe“.
Just hours later, Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei delivered a blunt counterstatement:
“We have not reached a final conclusion on this matter,”
emphasizing that the issue
“is currently being reviewed by the relevant decision-making bodies“.
The diplomatic gap is not only a mere difference in negotiation schedules. It highlights the differences between the U.S. and Iran concerning Iran’s nuclear program, rights for uranium enrichment, and sanctions relief, which had been blocking any peace talks for several months. On the one hand, Trump says:
“I understand the answer is yes”
about Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei’s support for the deal. On the other hand, it was stated in Iran that there has been no agreement because, as per the country’s parliament speaker,
“no negotiations have been held”.
This public difference between Iran and the U.S. prompts the question whether both sides operate on the same grounds.
Trump’s Optimistic Timeline Collides with Iran’s Skepticism
The President’s Weekend Signing Projection
President Trump’s declaration emerged during a press encounter at the White House on Thursday, where he portrayed the negotiations as nearly complete.
“The strait will officially open as soon as we sign, which could be soon, very soon, maybe over the weekend in Europe,”
Trump stated, referring to the Strait of Hormuz, a critical global shipping channel currently closed to commercial vessels amid the conflict.
The president’s specific timeline suggestion—signing within days—suggests either that he believes all substantive issues have been resolved or that he is willing to proceed with an incomplete agreement and address remaining disputes afterward.
Trump’s confidence appears bolstered by his claim that regional powers have endorsed the arrangement.
“The agreement had been approved by other countries in the region including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates,”
he announced on social media, lending apparent multilateral legitimacy to the deal.
Involvement of Israel, which conducted many attacks on Iran following a deadline of negotiation set for May 2025 without reaching an agreement, complicates any peace formula since Tehran traditionally sees participation of Israel as poisonous to negotiations with Washington.
Iran’s Institutional Caution and Red Lines
Iran’s response reflected the country’s institutional approach to high-stakes international negotiations, where decisions require review by multiple state bodies before becoming binding. Baghaei’s statement that
“This is a very important issue that is currently being reviewed by the relevant decision-making bodies”
signals that the Supreme Leader, the National Security Council, and possibly the parliament must all approve any agreement before Iran can commit. This multi-layered approval process, designed to prevent unilateral decisions that could compromise national interests, inherently slows negotiation timelines and creates opportunities for internal Iranian political factions to influence the outcome.
The foreign ministry spokesperson acknowledged that
“large parts of the text under negotiation have been finalised“,
indicating substantive progress on certain issues. However, Baghaei immediately qualified this progress by stating
“Iran would not compromise on its red lines“,
a reference to non-negotiable principles that include Iran’s right to uranium enrichment.
This statement clearly indicates that although technical agreements might have been reached, the political disagreement is yet to be sorted out. The use of ‘red lines’ by the spokesperson shows two aspects—one, as an internal political message for hard-line audiences in Iran, and two, as negotiation positions for the Americans.
The Nuclear Program Dispute: Enrichment Rights vs. Elimination Demands
Trump’s Absolute Position on Nuclear Weapons
The central obstacle to agreement remains Iran’s nuclear program, where the two sides hold fundamentally incompatible positions. Trump has consistently asserted that
“Iran must eliminate its enriched uranium and cease its nuclear program as part of any agreement“.
This position reflects the maximum-security approach favored by Trump’s national security team, which views any Iranian uranium enrichment capability as an unacceptable risk that could be rapidly converted to weapons production. Vice President J.D. Vance identified the
“concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program and its stockpile of highly enriched uranium as the primary obstacles”
to agreement, confirming that nuclear issues remain the negotiation’s primary bottleneck.
The insistence by the Trump administration on total disposal of enriched uranium is much stricter compared to what was asked from the Iranians before in earlier negotiations. In previous negotiations, such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action signed in 2015, Iran retained some rights regarding uranium enrichment under rigorous international supervision. The current demands of President Trump are thus against the Iranian right to enrich uranium, taking Iran back to a period before 2005 when it did not have an enriched uranium program at all.
Iran’s Non-Negotiable Right to Enrichment
Iran’s position on uranium enrichment represents one of the most deeply entrenched principles in its nuclear diplomacy. Iranian officials have previously declared their
“right to uranium enrichment as non-negotiable“,
a stance rooted in arguments about sovereign equality, technological development, and the right to peaceful nuclear energy under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
To Iran’s leaders, giving up the right to enrich uranium is seen as more than a mere act of yielding on policy; rather, it is viewed as a sign of failure and a compromise of national pride and technology. This stance has remained consistent through successive Iranian administrations.
In regard to the conflict between the demands put forth by Donald Trump and the enrichment claims of Iran, a clear case of “incompatible preferences” is observed, meaning that each of the parties insists on its positions not being negotiable. Normally, in such cases, the dispute can be overcome through creative redefinition, outside influence that will shift the balance of costs and benefits for one side, or a change in the interests of at least one of the leaders. Unfortunately, neither party currently seems interested in doing any of the aforementioned.
Sanctions Relief and Economic Incentives: The Other Side of the Equation
What Iran Demands Versus What US Offers
The economic angle of the discussion takes a different form in terms of controversy, as both parties have stated their particular claims, yet there might be some leeway on both sides in terms of achieving an agreement. Specifically, the claim of Iran is quite simple – the nation is “demanding sanctions lifted”, meaning the set of sanctions introduced by the USA which essentially paralyzes oil exports from the country, its banking system, and its foreign trade activities. Indeed, sanctions imposed over several administrations in the United States have reduced Iran’s GDP by about 25 percent since 2018.
The Trump administration’s offer appears more limited in scope. According to reports, the United States would
“lift the blockade on Iranian ports and ease some sanctions on oil exports“.
This formulation suggests partial rather than comprehensive sanctions relief, potentially leaving in place sanctions on banking, human rights, terrorism, and other categories.
The expression “relax some sanctions” refers to selective as opposed to total elimination, which will certainly be inadequate for the Iranians who have suffered the adverse effects of a comprehensive sanction policy. It is clear that there is a huge gap between the demands of the Iranians and the willingness of the Americans to ease some sanctions.
The Strait of Hormuz as a Strategic Leverage Point
The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz emerges as a potentially more achievable component of any agreement, given its importance to global energy markets and the relatively technical nature of the issue. The memorandum of understanding reportedly stipulates
“unrestricted through the Strait of Hormuz without toll”
and obligates Iran to eliminate obstruction “within 30 days”. Trump’s emphasis on the strait opening “as soon as we sign” suggests this provision receives high priority in US negotiations, likely reflecting concerns about global oil price stability and the strategic importance of maintaining shipping lanes.
With regards to Iran, possession or threat of control over the Strait of Hormuz is an important factor for them when dealing with the US government. The strait is responsible for the movement of about 20% of world oil supplies, and with its capability to disrupt shipping, it offers a bargaining chip that cannot be ignored by the US. An agreement to unconditionally reopen the strait free of any cost could be a gesture of goodwill made by the Iranians in return for substantial financial rewards.
Internal Iranian Political Dynamics and the Parliament Speaker’s Contradiction
The Official Ministry Position Versus Parliamentary Claims
A striking contradiction within Iran’s own government complicates the negotiation picture further. While Foreign Ministry spokesperson Baghaei acknowledged that
“most of the text of the agreement was finalized“,
Iran’s parliament speaker publicly posted that
“no negotiations have been held,”
accusing Trump of using deal announcements to “manipulate” public opinion.
These conflicting statements within the same regime show that either there are different tracks being negotiated by different Iranian bodies, that the parliament speaker is seeking to sabotage the stance of the foreign ministry, or that conflicting information is spreading throughout Iran’s political process.
The parliament speaker’s direct negation of any form of discussion is in opposition to the foreign ministry’s admission of finalized parts of the text. This may well indicate that Iran is experiencing internal conflicts, where hardliners use the speaker’s statement to block the formation of any agreement while other moderates seek compromise through the foreign ministry. Such conflicting statements can be expected from Iran in the context of its difficult negotiations, as no party can tell for sure whether Iran’s statements represent its real stance or political propaganda.
Decision-Making Bodies and Supreme Leader Approval
Baghaei’s reference to “relevant decision-making bodies” reviewing the agreement highlights Iran’s complex constitutional structure for foreign policy decisions.
In Iran’s governmental setup, any major international treaty needs the backing of several bodies such as that of the Supreme Leader who possesses complete powers concerning national security, the National Security Council that deals with issues of defense and international relations, the Majles that needs to approve any treaty, and the President who engages in the negotiating process.
Trump’s claim that
“I understand the answer is yes”
regarding Supreme Leader Khamenei’s approval suggests either that Iranian intermediaries have indicated tentative approval or that Trump is asserting confidence without verified information. Given the Supreme Leader’s ultimate authority over nuclear policy and national security, his approval would be essential for any agreement to proceed. However, the foreign ministry’s statement that the issue is still being reviewed suggests that final Supreme Leader approval has not yet been granted, creating a critical gap between Trump’s optimistic timeline and Iran’s institutional reality.
