The most fierce combat on the European continent since the conclusion of World War II began more than 1,000 days ago when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. All of this will be resolved in “24 hours,” according to US President-elect Donald Trump. However, a number of intricately interacting factors determine how the dispute develops. These variables could both assist and hurt the struggle in Ukraine, and how the next US administration handles them will be crucial to its efforts to end the conflict.
For Ukraine to withstand over three years of Russian aggression, Western financial and military support has been essential. However, the Western allies of Ukraine have also come under fire for doing “enough not to lose, but not enough to win.” According to analysts close to Trump’s team, if Kyiv is prepared to begin negotiations, military assistance to Ukraine would continue, which is expected to lessen Putin’s bargaining power. If it is profitable for US firms, or more likely, on US soil, Trump might also want to get more involved in defense production in Ukraine. Relatively durable has been the Russian war economy.
This is mostly because of the huge reserve monies that were amassed over the years of successful gas and oil exports and sanctions evasion. But the ruble has already been hurt by a recent wave of US sanctions that targeted Russia’s Gazprombank, and more wounds might soon surface. The EU’s new energy commissioner intends to eliminate its dependency on Russian gas by 2027, and reserve funds are running low. The Trump administration might allow more exports for new oil drilling and liquefied natural gas projects, which might lower world prices and further cut into Russia’s budgetary revenues. Secondary sanctions may be extended by the next US president; however, this has not been verified.
Disinformation efforts, hybrid warfare, Russian propaganda, and other KGB-style “active measures” cast doubt on Western policies, incite conflict among sizable social groups in specific nations, and break Western alliances. Although Trump does not want to appear weak or gullible in front of Putin, there are significant differences among his Republican colleagues over how to react to such hostility. The US response is unlikely to be successful if his first term is any indication, particularly since Trump’s history of being lenient toward Vladimir Putin might undo any progress made in this area.
Over the coming months and years, these (and other) elements may come together in a variety of ways. However, as listed below, they are likely to result in one of four outcomes. The scenarios are meant to serve as thinking exercises to help Ukraine’s European partners plan and coordinate, not as forecasts. Regardless of its inclusion in the Russian constitution, the West will never recognize Russia’s rights over Crimea or the occupied lands in the four Ukrainian regions (Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson).
The presidents of Ukraine and Russia are both urging peace. However, there is no indication that they will give up on their goals, especially considering how hotly debated “peace” is. The Kremlin wants to install a puppet government in Kyiv, rejects the idea of Ukraine joining NATO or the EU, and views the Crimean Peninsula and four Ukrainian territories as belonging to the Russian Federation. Ukraine wants to guarantee a fair and sustainable peace, maintain its independence and sovereignty, and reestablish its territorial integrity. It seems that both parties think that using military force will help them better position themselves in advance of any ceasefire negotiations and a “peace plan.”
As a result, this situation appears unlikely in the foreseeable future. However, Trump might try to make the quick end of hostilities a requirement for backing Ukraine’s NATO membership application or a pledge to make large investments in Ukraine’s reconstruction. A frozen conflict of this kind may be possible if these factors were combined with a rather solid Russian economy, a general cutback in military assistance for Ukraine, at least some success in Russia’s subversive actions, and obvious symptoms of weariness in Ukrainian society.
In this case, the question of security guarantees is crucial. It is improbable that NATO would agree to admit Ukraine very soon or that Trump will offer Ukraine the same security guarantees that South Korea and Japan have received. Since Russia has recovered its military capabilities, hostilities might begin with an advantage, making the combat freeze unlikely to persist for long.
If Trump is unable to persuade Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to agree to the terms of a truce, the combat will go on. However, this scenario would also necessitate that Russia’s subversive actions against the West only partially succeed, that the Russian economy be robust enough to sustain the military operations, and that Western military assistance to Ukraine continue to be significant. In essence, nothing has changed.
