For decades, Europe’s security, technology, energy and financial systems have been deeply intertwined with the United States. NATO underpinned European defense, American technology powered European businesses, and U.S. energy exports helped fill the gap left by Russian supplies.
That relationship is now being reassessed.
As transatlantic relations strain under President Donald Trump’s confrontational rhetoric — including threats to take over Greenland and repeated attacks on European governments — the European Union is cautiously beginning to reduce its dependence on Washington. The shift is gradual, selective, and framed as “de-risking” rather than severing ties, but the direction is unmistakable.
Why Is Europe Rethinking Its Reliance on the US?
European leaders say the geopolitical assumptions of the past no longer hold.
For years, the EU trusted that American security guarantees and open access to U.S. technology were permanent fixtures. Trump’s return to the White House has challenged that belief, reviving fears that U.S. policy toward Europe could become transactional, unpredictable, or even openly hostile.
“If we want to be taken seriously again, we will have to learn the language of power politics,”
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said last week — a remark that encapsulated a growing consensus among Europe’s political class.
EU officials now warn that transatlantic relations are unlikely to revert to their pre-Trump norms anytime soon.
De-Risking, Not Decoupling
Brussels is careful about its language.
Officials stress that Europe is not seeking a clean break from the United States — still its largest trade partner and most important security ally — but rather a reduction in strategic vulnerabilities. Until recently, the term “de-risking” was almost exclusively used to describe Europe’s approach to China. Today, it is increasingly applied to the U.S.
The challenge is scale. The United States remains a dominant destination for European exports and a cornerstone of European defense planning. According to Jean-Luc Demarty, former head of the European Commission’s trade department, unwinding that dependence will take years.
“It’s a lot,” Demarty said of Europe’s trade exposure to the U.S.,
“but it’s not a matter of life and death.”
Trade Diversification: Looking Beyond Washington
As part of its diversification push, the European Commission has accelerated trade negotiations with non-U.S. partners.
Recent moves include:
- Trade agreements with the Mercosur bloc of Latin American countries
- Expanded trade engagement with India and Indonesia
- A revamped trade deal with Mexico
- The revival of long-stalled negotiations with Australia
Together, these deals are intended to broaden Europe’s commercial options and reduce its exposure to any single partner — including the United States.
Can Europe Defend Itself Without NATO?
Security is where dependence on the U.S. runs deepest.
Since World War II, Europe has relied on NATO — and by extension Washington — as the ultimate guarantor of its safety. While the EU has had its own mutual defense clause (Article 42.7) since 2009, it was long viewed as redundant so long as NATO’s Article 5 remained unquestioned.
That assumption is now under strain.
At a recent summit in Zagreb, conservative European leaders, including Chancellor Merz, called for strengthening the EU’s mutual defense commitment and developing genuine European military command structures.
“For decades, some countries said, ‘We have NATO, why build parallel structures?’”
a senior EU diplomat said.
“After Trump’s Greenland saber-rattling, that logic no longer holds.”
How Realistic Is Strategic Autonomy?
NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte offered a blunt assessment last week, telling EU lawmakers that anyone who believes Europe can defend itself without the U.S. should “keep on dreaming.”
Indeed, Europe remains heavily reliant on U.S. capabilities in surveillance, intelligence, strategic airlift, missile defense and space-based assets — especially in supporting Ukraine’s war against Russia.
Still, a growing number of European policymakers argue that reducing dependence is costly but manageable, and preferable to strategic vulnerability.
Technology: Europe’s Push for Digital Sovereignty
The clearest shift is occurring in technology.
European reliance on U.S. platforms such as Google, Meta, Microsoft and X has long troubled regulators and voters alike. That unease has now evolved into concrete policy discussions.
France is preparing to ban public officials from using U.S.-based videoconferencing tools such as Google Meet, Zoom and Microsoft Teams. Instead, officials will switch to Visio, a platform hosted on French-owned infrastructure.
Germany is considering similar measures, while lawmakers across the EU are pressing for alternatives to U.S. software — including data analysis tools made by Palantir.
“It’s very clear that Europe is having our independence moment,”
said EU tech chief Henna Virkkunen.
“We cannot be dependent on one country or one company for critical technologies.”
Are European Tech Alternatives Emerging?
Pressure is mounting to “Europeanize” digital infrastructure.
In the European Parliament, lawmakers are urging a shift away from U.S. hardware, software and travel booking systems. In the Netherlands, legislators are reviewing a public petition signed by 140,000 people opposing the sale of a state identity verification system to a U.S. firm.
At the World Economic Forum in Davos, German entrepreneur Anna Zeiter announced the launch of a Europe-based social media platform, W, positioned as an alternative to Elon Musk’s X. The platform will host data on European servers and limit investment to European backers.
Upcoming EU legislation on cloud computing and artificial intelligence is expected to further reinforce this push.
Energy Security: Avoiding a New Dependency
Energy is another area of concern.
The United States currently supplies more than a quarter of the EU’s natural gas — a share likely to grow as Europe phases out Russian imports. But EU officials warn that replacing Russian energy dependence with American dependence carries its own risks.
Trump’s statements on Greenland served as a “wake-up call,” said EU Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen, highlighting how energy security and geopolitics are increasingly intertwined.
As a result, Brussels is stepping up efforts to diversify supplies, deepening talks with Canada, Qatar and North African producers such as Algeria.
Finance and Payments: Reclaiming Monetary Sovereignty
European dependence on U.S.-based payment systems like Visa and Mastercard is also under scrutiny.
The European Central Bank’s planned digital euro — slated for launch around 2029 — is designed to provide a sovereign, pan-European payment option. ECB President Christine Lagarde has framed it as a way to keep Europeans
“in control of their money, their choices and their future.”
In Germany, concerns extend even to gold reserves. Some lawmakers argue that storing over 1,200 tons of German gold in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York is no longer acceptable in an era of geopolitical uncertainty.
Military Procurement: Buying European
The EU has begun backing its strategic ambitions with money. A €150 billion defense investment program finalized last year limits non-EU components in major arms purchases to 35 percent. Notably, the United States is excluded from the list of partner countries under the scheme.
The European People’s Party, the EU’s dominant conservative bloc, is pushing to extend “Buy European” principles to future joint procurement projects. When EPP leaders agreed on their 2026 roadmap in Zagreb, they gave it a telling title: “Time for Independence.”
A Long and Uneven Transition
Europe’s retreat from U.S. dependence is neither sudden nor absolute. The United States remains indispensable in many areas, particularly defense. But the shift in mindset is real.
What was once unthinkable — questioning Europe’s reliance on Washington — is now openly debated at the highest political levels. The path toward autonomy will be slow, uneven and costly, but for many European leaders, continued dependence now looks like the greater risk.
