Germany’s strategic posture evolves in response to Trump’s policies

Germans have witnessed a severe, comprehensive attack on the three pillars of the bilateral relationship with the United States—trade, security, and shared values—during the first 100 days of President Donald Trump’s administration.

Germany is particularly at risk from U.S. tariff threats, with its exports to America representing around 4 per cent of its GDP. Its defence and security policy is organized mainly within NATO and with a view to maintaining a sustained U.S. presence in Europe—Germany harbours the largest number of U.S. troops on the continent and deploys American nuclear missiles on its soil.

The future of these agreements has been called into question by Trump’s first few months in office. Though not wholly anticipated, these events are very unsettling for German officials who are still dealing with the fallout from his first term. Concerns that the United States is not just indifferent to but actively hostile to European security interests have increased as a result of the White House’s agitation of Ukraine, Trump’s willingness to negotiate with Russia without first consulting his European or Ukrainian counterparts, and the president’s expansionist plans for Greenland.

But a turning point in German strategic thought was the address given by U.S. Vice President JD Vance at the Munich Security Conference in February 2025. Vance’s speech challenged the fundamental presumptions of transatlantic alignment and highlighted Berlin’s concerns about the ideological aspirations of influential figures in Washington. Vance said that domestic problems like EU immigration and purported censorship practices were more dangerous to democracy than foreign enemies like China or Russia. He also accused European governments of stifling free expression.

For many members of the German political elite, the defence of the European political project and the dedication to the EU as a project for peace and democracy rather than merely a market are essential components of who they are. Furthermore, Vance’s public criticism of the exclusion of populist parties—naming Germany’s far-right AfD in particular—and his following private meeting with Alice Weidel, the leader of the AfD, was widely seen in Berlin as a violation of sovereignty and meddling in domestic German affairs.

In response, incoming chancellor Friedrich Merz, a lifetime ardent transatlanticist, articulated a new geopolitical doctrine: gradual European independence from the United States. Merz called the Munich meeting a “historic date.” Germany’s own conception of its position in the international system is also seriously challenged by America’s shifting views on global affairs.

Berlin is inherently cautious. The German public and political elite have not yet demonstrated a strong desire to take on a leadership role, even in the European setting where the U.S. exit is creating a void. They believe they are severely restricted at home. 

Due to rising energy prices and growing competition from China, Germany’s economy has stagnated for the last three years. It is still extremely exposed to American tariffs and the larger trade dispute between the United States and China, which may cause a flood of Chinese goods to enter the European market. Assertive foreign policy is further hampered by the growth and mounting pressure of the German extreme right.

Germany frequently still looks to the UK and France to take on more forward-thinking security tasks, even with its ambitious ambitions for defense investment. Germany remains a status-quo power negotiating a post-American order with institutionalism, economic weight, and strategic prudence, embodying the adage made by former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that the nation was “too big for Europe, too small for the world.”

Anlehnungsmacht—a “power to lean on”—remains its governing paradigm. It is hesitant to take unilateral action but is essential owing to its size and economic clout. However, Berlin now aims to revitalize and strengthen its European and international alliances following three years of Scholz’s introspective and domestically focused leadership. 

The EU, NATO, and minilateral formats like the E3 (France, the UK, and Germany), the Weimar Triangle (France, Poland, and Germany), and more recent or newly relevant strategic partnerships with nations like Canada, India, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea are still Germany’s preferred means of pursuing resilience through alignment and influencing outcomes multilaterally.

Germany has not yet given up on protecting the international order that has allowed Germans to prosper since the conclusion of World War II, despite its grave concern over the United States’ attack on it. It sees no other workable options.