After the US President Donald Trump administration made the move to alter the status of Syrian diplomats at the UN mission, where the US refused to recognize the new Syrian government, a question arises: What does the Trump administration seek from Syria? Is it employing non-recognition as a negotiating tool to influence Damascus, and maybe its regional and international supporters?
The US administration’s move can be viewed as mainly technical in the sense that it is bureaucratic and not political. For instance, the move to modify the visa type depends on an internal evaluation that deems the interim transitional government in Syria as an extension of institutions unfit for the US, particularly in relation to its suspected connections to factions labeled as terrorist organisations. Its technical character is attested to by the fact that it is published by institutions of a technical, as opposed to political, character, like the Department of Homeland Security.
But this is not to say that the move has no political undertones, and it also means that removal of the sanctions is not on the agenda of the Trump administration. There are chances that the Trump administration might reverse the decision of the US Treasury Department during the Biden administration, which included a six-month reprieve from the sanctions, extendable. This implies that the path to Syria’s recovery from its economic crisis remains long, considering that the US intervention in this aspect is significant, and that such policies could drive many nations to alter their stance towards relations with Damascus for fear of being targeted by US sanctions.
What is fascinating here is that despite being at its peak of struggle with Iran, Russia and Assad regime, while commanding an international coalition through Military Operations Centre (MOC) offices in Jordan and Turkiye, it didn’t come as far as withholding recognition of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime, nor was the status or privileges of Syrian diplomats in the UN mission in New York impacted.
In addition, the new Damascus government has de facto legitimacy, a legitimacy upon which most nations of the South were able to smoothly integrate themselves into the global system without issues or difficulty. In addition, the ouster of the Assad regime had geopolitical implications that favored Washington’s interests, as part of its efforts to reduce Iranian influence in the area.
Different evaluations and analyses of the US stance indicate that Washington continues to assess the new regime in Damascus in order to come to terms with an agreement for handling this regime, which is largely made up of Islamist forces headed by Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham, which Washington categorises as a “terrorist organization.” Nevertheless, this new Syrian regime is trying to devise a moderate system of government of Islamic inclination, as in Turkiye and Malaysia, to secure the sanction of the external world.
However, American political conduct is still guarded in handling this new government, with reactions varying from putting it under surveillance to probing it through a series of conditions offered by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Levant and Syria Affairs, Natasha Franceschi, to Syrian Foreign Minister, Asaad Al-Shaibani, on the margins of the donors’ conference.
Additionally, the Trump administration is seeing a divergence of opinions between the White House and the State Department on how to handle Damascus. The White House (which houses most pro-Israel sympathizers) seems to be the most effective at deciding the type of policies to be pursued toward Damascus.
However, the policy of the Trump administration remains more or less unclear and undefined. There is no direct negative attitude toward the new Syrian government’s policies, which have indicated that it is prepared to cooperate on matters of great interest for Washington, such as cooperation in the fight against the Islamic State (Daesh) and the chemical weapons issue.
The American government does not appear to be all that concerned about the minority factor, especially considering that President Ahmad Al-Sharaa’s regime is going out of its way to appease Christians, Washington’s greatest priority. The rest of the pieces fall into place as a matter of course for Washington. The Trump government has signaled its relative contentment with the measures of the Sharaa administration on the constitutional declaration and formation of the government, or has at least shown no overt objections to these steps.
That is, the Trump administration is not concerned about the details of Syria proper, or about the character of policies undertaken by the Syrian administration, as a sign of the unimportance of Syria for the Trump administration, particularly following Iran’s withdrawal and Russia’s deterioration.
As a result, the strategic priority (already low in the view of the Trump administration) has dropped to zero, pushing Syria out of the priorities of the Trump administration into a forgotten file. Its affairs could be left in the hands of regional and international players in the next phase, as mounting evidence points towards the US withdrawal from Syria, which is no longer an option, but has moved into the implementation phase through the repeated gradual withdrawal of US troops from eastern Syria.
The Trump administration will probably not have a Syria policy in the near future, nor will it invest diplomatically in Syria. It will probably follow a policy of muddling along by means of low-level diplomacy to manage the Turkey-Israel relationship. At best, it will make Syria a negotiating card for local actors who would like to profit from the Syrian dynamic, particularly because they hold the instruments capable of paralysing Syria: US sanctions, the continuation of which would prevent any potential to move beyond fragility and risk.
