The launch of Operation Epic Fury on February 28, 2026 marked a defining moment in the evolution of cyber-first warfare. Instead of treating cyber capabilities as support tools, United States military planners placed digital operations at the forefront of the conflict. Initial phases were led by United States Cyber Command and United States Space Command, which targeted Iranian digital infrastructure before conventional strikes began.
According to statements delivered during a Pentagon briefing by Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, cyber operations disrupted Iranian communications and sensor networks. This disruption reduced the ability of command units to coordinate air defenses or communicate across operational zones. Military planners presented the sequence as an example of how cyber-first warfare can weaken an adversary’s decision-making structure before kinetic force is applied.
The opening stage reportedly targeted more than one thousand strategic and tactical nodes. Network infrastructure, industrial control systems, and digital command platforms were among the first elements affected, demonstrating a strategy built around disabling an opponent’s information architecture.
The operational mechanics behind the Epic Fury model
Modern cyber-first warfare depends on synchronized attacks across digital and physical domains. Operation Epic Fury illustrated how cyber effects can prepare the battlefield before traditional combat begins.
Disrupting digital infrastructure before kinetic operations
Initial cyber operations targeted routing systems and communications networks across Iran. Analysts reported that disruptions to Border Gateway Protocol routing and domain name systems reduced national internet functionality to minimal levels for several hours.
These interference hindered military coordination and surveillance. Radar systems linked to networked command structures got disrupted and communication between command centers and field units was hampered.
These types of attacks show how cyber-first warfare attempts to minimize the awareness of the battlefield. As the command networks fail to be effective, the traditional units find it hard to organize air defenses, missile strikes, or troop movements.
Integration with simultaneous military strikes
When the communication networks had been undermined by cyber interruptions, the traditional operations were launched against air defense installations and command bases. The intelligence collected in the course of cyber intrusion was used to assist the planners to determine radar nodes, missile positions, and command centers so that they could make precise attacks.
During the initial stages of the operation, cyber intelligence was also used to offer battle damage estimates. Digital monitoring enabled the analysts to verify whether specific systems had been brought down or more strikes were necessary.
This merger between cyber operations and kinetic force shows how the military doctrines are progressively viewing cyberspace as a field of operation as much as the terrestrial land, the sea, the sky, and space.
Israeli cyber operations amplify the strategy
Simultaneous activity by Israel increased the scope of cyber-first warfare on the operation. Israeli forces also undertook another cyber campaign which they dubbed Operation Roaring Lion and it was aimed at disrupting Iranian information networks.
Information warfare and psychological messaging
Apparently, cyber units have managed to crack into Iranian state media systems and state-linked mobile apps. A popular platform that was being discussed was BadeSaba, which is a navigation and services application with millions of Iranian citizens.
Digital broadcasts via such channels prompted military officers to turn and never take part in combat operations. Messages were given guarantees of safety to soldiers who disobeyed instructions.
The role of information warfare has become an emerging part of cyber-first warfare. Digital operations have the capacity to manipulate morale and perception of the people by using their communication channels that the people trust, even in the case of a conflict.
Coordinated cyber disruption across networks
There were also Israeli cyberspace units that attacked the digital infrastructure of ministries and news agencies related to Israel. Analysts noted that there were short time breaks on websites associated with Islamic Republic News Agency.
Such interference was not aimed at silencing media houses only. They were rather used to show the weakness of state systems and enhance pressure on the decision-makers, psychologically.
Iran’s cyber retaliation and asymmetric response
The initial stages of the cyber-first warfare were met with a response of cyber activity, proxy operations and the use of missiles by Iran. Analysts noted that retaliation was concerned with cost-imposing measures and not the escalation that could lead to wider military actions.
Hacktivist groups and distributed attacks
Cyber activist groups with Iranian interests were found by security researchers to operate around 60 hacktivist groups that were involved in cyber attacks on the infrastructure of the region. These groups posted denial-of-service attacks and phishing scams against networks in Israel and other countries.
One of the methods was malware in the form of emergency alert software. Victims who downloaded the program unwillingly installed surveillance tools that had the ability to intercept messages and location information.
These loosely coordinated activities are indicative of long term dependence on cyber proxies by Iran. Sharing blame among informally connected groups of people, the states can also establish plausible deniability and pressure on the opponents.
Advanced persistent threat activity
There were a number of Iranian-related cyber troopers that went on more reconnaissance missions during the war. Sectors like APT33 and APT35 were seen to investigate energy and finance systems.
The security agencies analyzing the traffic cautioned that the groups have the potential of executing devastating malware on infrastructural networks. The analysts feel that reconnaissance in the initial stages of the conflict can be setting the stage of future disruptive attacks.
Iranian officials also advised the citizens about possible foreign cyber intrusions. The government encouraged internet users to uninstall some mobile applications considered to be intercepted by the foreign intelligence services.
Foundations laid by cyber developments during 2025
The Epic Fury operational model did not create itself. A number of advances in 2025 provided the foundation of introducing cyber-first warfare in military planning.
Military exercises testing cyber integration
In 2025, during combined operations, the United States forces tested digital operations, which could be used to disrupt simulated adversary networks prior to conventional warfare. Such exercises included cyber experts who partnered with air and naval forces.
These exercises were an exercise of coordinating the use of cyber attacks in line with the missile attacks and electronic warfare. Experiences in these exercises affected planning structures in the course of the Epic Fury campaign.
Expanding cyber capabilities among adversaries
The cyber units of Iran also continued to develop in 2025. According to intelligence reports, there has been a growing tendency to use artificial intelligence to produce phishing messages and to carry out a network reconnaissance that is automated.
Studies of attacks on local energy systems underscored the increasing concern of Iran on the industrial control systems. These systems maintain infrastructures like pipelines, refineries and electrical grids.
The growth of cyber capacity on each side of the line formed a strategic environment where digital disruption was able to have a major impact on the battlefield.
Strategic implications for future conflicts
Operation Epic Fury can be examined as an example of how future military strategy can be changed by cyber-first warfare. Analysts opine that digital operations come with a number of benefits in the pre-conflict phases.
Reducing reliance on physical munitions
Cyber attacks have the ability to put out communication systems, radar systems, and infrastructure without necessarily involving massive counts of missiles or bombs. The feature decreases operation expenses and curbs physical damage.
Cyber attacks are increasingly being considered by military planners as a tool of undermining the ability of an enemy prior to the deployment of mass military forces. Should there be success, these disruptions may make the conflicts short or minimize casualties.
Blurring the line between war and competition
Cyber-first warfare makes the conventional definitions of conflict more difficult. Digital warfare is possible without the declaration of war, which means that the escalation points are less obvious.
The opposition can retaliate through cyber attack instead of traditional military response. This dynamic develops a strategic environment in which digital operations are being made a form of competition that runs through.
Global military observers and evolving doctrine
Epic Fury has provided the major powers with a lot to think over in terms of operational lessons. Such nations as Russia and China have considerable cyber ones and have put a lot of investments in the war doctrine based on the digital one.
Analysts researching the conflict perceive cyber-first warfare as a more profound move toward multi-domain operations. Cyberspace has become a factor that is being incorporated in the preparation of operational plans by military planners, in addition to the conventional battlefields.
The Middle Eastern regional allies are also reviewing their defensive moves. Cyber security defenses are becoming on a par with physical security in terms of energy infrastructures, communication systems, and transport systems.
Cybersecurity firms monitoring the conflict warn that digital tools used in wartime often spread beyond their original targets. Malware developed for military operations may eventually appear in criminal campaigns or espionage efforts.
Operation Epic Fury illustrates how cyber-first warfare is transitioning from theoretical doctrine to operational reality. As militaries invest further in digital capabilities, the critical question facing governments and security planners may not be whether cyber operations will shape future conflicts, but how nations will defend the complex networks that now underpin both civilian life and modern warfare.
