These days, following the expiration of the New START treaty–the last nuclear arms control agreement still in effect between the two powers–indicators emanating from the Trump administration pointed to an extraordinary turn in nuclear policy. The latter signaled that the U.S. is debating enlarging its nuclear arsenal and conducting nuclear tests, thus reversing its nuclear policy over nearly four decades.
These steps would, if taken, make Donald Trump the first U.S. president after Reagan to add to the number of deployed nuclear weapons in the United States. The United States has not conducted a nuclear test since 1992; however, last year, President Trump expressed a desire to resume nuclear testing, effusively stating the need to do so “on an equal basis” with Russia and China.
Vague Policy Signals Raise Arms Race Concerns
So far, however, the administration has not provided details on its intentions. It has spoken about scenarios involving the redeployment of stored weapons and resuming test programs, but not about how many might be deployed or what kind of tests could happen. Analysts say the ambiguity is either a ploy to forge a pathway to negotiations-or the opening salvo in a new nuclear arms race.
Jill Hruby, a former head of the National Nuclear Security Agency, described the policy direction as confusing and poorly defined, noting uncertainty over whether the moves are strategic pressure tactics or genuine force expansion plans.
Rejecting Treaty Extensions and Framing Arms Control as Constraint
The New START treaty, which limits the number of deployed nuclear warheads to about 1,550 on each side, expired without a replacement after the Trump administration rejected a Russian offer of an informal extension of the treaty. Immediately after the treaty’s expiration, the new US Under Secretary of State, Thomas G. DiNanno, acknowledged that the treaty had included unacceptable unilateral limits on the US.
He also cited the prior withdrawal of the US from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty, citing Russian breaches of these treaties, and argued that any new treaty would also have to involve China, which is rapidly increasing its nuclear capability. Mr. DiNanno also made it clear that the US now had the freedom to bolster its nuclear deterrence capability, citing existing programs to modernize its nuclear capability, including new submarines, bombers, and missiles, as well as non-deployed nuclear capability that can be deployed if ordered to do so by the president.
Expanding Deployed Forces and Theater-Range Weapons
Options that are currently under consideration include an expansion of existing nuclear capabilities and developing new nuclear weapons with shorter ranges–similar to those possessed by Russia. New START had only limited long-range strategic weapons; tactical nuclear weapons were outside of that arrangement.
A substantial increase in the near term will potentially be provided by the US Navy’s Ohio-class submarines. In order for them to comply with New START, four of their missile tubes on each of their submarines were made incapable of being used. Now that the treaty has expired, plans are being made to reactivate these missiles, potentially providing hundreds more nuclear warheads for the US.
Nuclear Modernization as Negotiation Leverage or Arms Buildup
Experts have also proposed that these moves by the administration might be a bargaining tactic that aims to bring Russia and China to negotiations with the U.S. for trilateral arms control talks. However, experts have asserted that Russia and China might respond by increasing their own arsenals instead of being brought to negotiations.
China, for example, has traditionally been opposed to arms control agreements, and it considers transparency measures to be intrusive and indicative of strategic weakness. Nuclear strategists Franklin Miller and Eric Edelman propose the idea that
“China is unlikely to become engaged in arms control until the size of its nuclear stockpile is approaching the level of the United States and Russia.”
Revisiting Nuclear Testing and “Zero-Yield” Norms
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, signed in 1996, bans all nuclear test explosions, including small ones. Although not ratified by the USA, all three countries have observed a moratorium on tests, although North Korea carried out six tests between 2006 and 2017.
Trump nuclear signals sparked initial concerns of a resumption of large underground tests similar to those conducted during the Cold War. These large underground nuclear tests generate seismic shock waves. However, some analysts were of the view that Trump wanted to carry out undetected low-yield tests.
Allegations of Covert Chinese Testing and “Decoupling” Techniques
DiNanno told the Geneva gathering that China and Russia already have carried out surreptitious nuclear tests, and the United States should do the same. He asserted that China carried out one in secret last June, a claim rejected by international monitoring systems, which detected no sign of an explosion. There are divisions in US intelligence assessments.
DiNanno cited “decoupling” methods-those that would dampen the seismic signal by containing the explosion in a reinforced cavity. The United States had similarly experimented with decoupling methods during the Cold War, even running dozens of clandestine tests during moratorium periods.
Ambiguity Over “Responsible” Nuclear Testing
While DiNanno stated that the United States aimed to restore “responsible” behavior in nuclear testing, he did not define what such responsibility would entail. The ambiguity leaves open questions about whether Washington is preparing for symbolic low-yield experiments, full-scale detonations, or simply signaling strategic intent.
A Return to Nuclear Brinkmanship?
The expiration of New START and the Trump administration’s rhetoric have revived fears of a destabilizing nuclear competition among the world’s major powers. Whether the policy signals are negotiation tactics or the beginning of a new era of nuclear brinkmanship remains unclear.
What is certain is that decades of incremental arms control progress are now under threat, and the global nuclear order is entering a period of unprecedented uncertainty.
